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Civil Society and Conflict Prevention in US Infrastructure
Roundtable Report
June 2, 2008
3D Security Initiative at Eastern Mennonite University

Goal and Purpose of Roundtable: Both governments and civil society have the challenge of “horizontal integration” to ensure that they coordinate their work with other agencies or organizations working at the same level.  At the top levels in Washington DC, inter-agency coordination is given growing importance.  In civil society – there is endless frustration at our lack of coordination with each other.

The focus of this roundtable is “vertical integration” – how do government and military agencies interface with civil society organizations.  Security policymaking should be both “wide and deep.”  There should be a wide interagency or “3D” approach to foreign policy as well as a deep approach to link government and military to local non-governmental organizations working in conflict regions. 

The 3D Security Initiative fosters “vertical integration” between government/military and civil society organizations.  The 3D Security Initiative is part of two civil society networks: the Alliance for Peacebuilding which is a network of over 60 international NGOs based in the US, and the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, which is a network of over 1000 NGOs, many started by graduates of our program here at Eastern Mennonite University.  GPPAC, as it is known, is made up of 16 regional secretariats.  It is an effort for civil society to organize and choose representatives who can interface directly with policy makers in their region.

This roundtable was a unique opportunity for leaders from local civil society in regions of conflict and the U.S. government and military to reflect on current opportunities for dialogue and possibilities for improved future interaction.  The goal was to hold a dialogue to reflect the principles of respectful speaking and listening on both sides. As such, the facilitator provided some guidelines for the dialogue.

1. Accept the Tensions: The tensions between civil society and governments are challenging but necessary.  Good governance – and wise decision-making – are products of the combination of citizen-focused, functioning states and active civil society organizations to hold government accountable.
2. Future-oriented: The dialogue tried to stay focused on what we can learn from the past and what to recommend as better strategies for the future.
3. Operational, not Foreign Policy Dimensions: While many civil society organizations oppose US interventions in their countries, this roundtable does not focus on U.S. foreign policy in general.  Rather, it focuses on the operational interface between the US government and military with local civil society organizations where US policy has already been set.
4. Recognize Diversity: There are a diversity of voices and opinions in both civil society and in the US government and military.  This roundtable was an opportunity to get beyond stereotyping, to begin to form better understanding and relationships.
5. Common Ground: While acknowledging areas of disagreement, the goal of this roundtable was to highlight common goals that we share.  While many different terms are used for working in regions of conflict – including peace operations, stability operations, reconstruction, conflict prevention, peacebuilding – there are some shared principles.

Schedule: In the morning, there were two panels.  The first panel of government and military representatives from USAID, State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and the US Army War College’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute described how they see and experience or understand the interaction between the US infrastructure and civil society as it is now – or as they think it should be.

In the second panel, civil society representatives from Iraq, Afghanistan and Ghana described how they see civil society can contribute to the analysis phase of USG or inter-agency assessment of local context/conflict,  how civil society can participate in policy planning/intervention strategies for their region, and how civil society interfaces with USG at an operational level in the field.

Findings and Recommendations

Panel 1: How do USAID, State, and Military currently interface with civil society – and what could be done to increase interaction?

Recognition of Civil Society: Representatives from the State Department, USAID, and the US military each noted the importance of working with civil society actors and noted that there currently is not as much interaction as there could or should be.  At the field level, there are multiple opportunities for input from civil society. AID provides funding to assist NGOs to do work on the ground.  Civil society provides necessary information that shapes USAID programming.  The USAID process is driven by resources – how those resources are made available includes the voices of civil society.  Civil society organizations are USAID’s implementing partners.  However, as decisions are made up at higher levels at USAID, opportunity for input from civil society becomes more limited.

S/CRS realizes the need to better cooperate with civil society.  However, S/CRS is currently focused on organizing internally and building up an office of civilian readiness and response.  S/CRS anticipates significant engagement with civil society in the future.

In general, the military recognizes the need to get better at partnering with civil society.  Many military personnel view themselves as members of civil society, not apart from it.  There is also a sense of military personnel holding themselves and their families accountable to civil society.  At the operational level, there is an appeal to talking to local people on the ground – doing an assessment of the situation from the bottom up. 

Need to Develop New Mechanisms: Many questions persist regarding what kind of process and structures are necessary for the military and civil society to better engage in dialogue.  There are interagency opportunities called after action reviews for different U.S. agencies to jointly evaluate collaboration.  These are excellent opportunities for learning.  A challenge, however, is feeding interagency lessons learned up the chain of command.  And to include civil society in reviewing what works and what does not.  The Consortium of Complex Operations (CCO) is a “shared space” for interaction between government, NGOs, and academia –– aimed at how to better prepare military and government officers before complex operations so that people can operate together. 

Build Relationships Over Time: Relationships with civil society must be built and developed over time.  It is nearly impossible to develop these relationships in times of acute crisis when tensions are flaring.

Refrain from Stereotyping: We have stereotypes of each other on both sides.  It is important for all of us to face our stereotypes and help educate ourselves so that we can see the diversity in civil society actors, military actors and other government actors.  We are not all the same.  This can be really difficult to do in crisis environments, so we should find ways to build relationships with each other in the long term. 

Discuss Both the Good and the Bad: Acknowledging some of the mistakes of the past and efforts to correct cultural insensitivities and wrongdoing, panelists noted it is also important to acknowledge the efforts to include civil society, how the military has saved lives, has apologized for wrongdoing such as the recent incident in Iraq where a lone soldier used the Koran for target practice, and for the changes in US policies in response to mistakes.  We have a responsibility to educate each other with both sides of the story.  We have a responsibility to study what Blackwater is doing, for example, where they have saved international lives by the restraint of force.  We need to be prepared to talk about both the good and the bad in order to be credible with each other.

It is not always clear how the US government communicates its policy changes to civil society.  When a policy such as frisking women changes, it is frustrating to still hear complaints about it a long time after the policy changes to end the practice.  Civil society should recognize and acknowledge that the US government and military do change their policies and do offer apologies. This is a continuing challenge.

Panel 2: What are the current challenges and recommendations for how civil society actors want to interface with the US government and military?

Both “Thanks” and Concern: Civil society leaders both recognized the need sometimes for outside intervention to assist them in addressing governance problems in their countries.  But they questioned how this intervention has been taking place, noting that it often appears to make the situation considerably worse, killing many innocent civilians and not solving the root causes.  They asked for greater participation and respect in how they interface with the US government and military.

Local Culture: Civil society panelists noted that the US military needs to become better acquainted with local traditions and culture. A lack of basic knowledge hampers their effectiveness and understanding of local dynamics.  The lack of personal relationships between U.S. government or military personnel and civil society exacerbate cultural challenges of operating in foreign environments.  Civil society representatives highlighted incidents of cultural disrespect by U.S. personnel including the frisking of women; the Koran being used for target practice; etc. Participants highlighted that these challenges have historical resonance, as they recounted how Soviet forces in Afghanistan did similar actions like painting a sickle and hammer on a mosque.    

Security: Local NGOs are often endangered if they are seen to be in cooperation with the US military or government agencies like USAID.  Local NGOs who have a trusting relationship across ethnic and religious lines do not need armed security to do their humanitarian, development and conflict prevention work.  Trusting relationships with local community leaders take the place of armed security systems. Local NGOs are able to have much greater flexibility of movement in their work – and to achieve far more – in a cost-effective way without buying armed security.  There is a frustration that more resources aren’t given to local NGOs who are able to do this cost-effective work. Civil society noted that they saw some of the military’s development projects as imaginary – paying local authorities money for a pretend development project as a way of buying security.  They noted there is often little “development” impact for the amount of money that was spent to pay off local leaders.

Lack of forums for respectful dialogue: An Iraqi participant noted that the forums for the US military to communicate with local civil society were experienced by civil society leaders as “humiliating and disrespectful.”  NGOs were expected to walk through multiple checkpoints, repeatedly showing their documents to prove their identities.  Once inside, they could listen, but could not dialogue or raise their own issues for discussion.  They noted it wasn’t an equal partnership.  “They wanted information from us, but they did not share information.” 

Colonial History: Any US intervention in another country is saddled with the history of colonial relationships in many parts of the world, particularly Africa.  People still believe, “When the elephants fight, it’s the grass that gets trampled.”  This history and lack of trust makes coordination with civil society more challenging, as often civil society distrusts their own government and are skeptical of outsiders supporting their government without cultural or contextual understanding. More emphasis should be placed on listening to civil society groups and not just government analysts and diplomats.

Improved understanding of culture and conflict
Many participants and panelists noted the challenge of culture and language as US government and military try to relate to local civil society. One military participant noted, “How do you teach 200, 0000 people to be culturally sensitive, particularly when they are constantly being replaced by new soldiers or staff?”

While many agreed that more cultural education and listening to the people of the area is important, several significant barriers were identified.  First, bureaucracy and systems change very slowly.  There is a lot of paperwork and permissions for approval needed, and many departments are under-staffed. Some identified the lack of risk taking – that some government and military departments do not have a culture of risk taking to figure out how to build relationships with local civil society.  Weak governments and growing corruption are also challenges.

It is critical to identify, for example, who in the military is Arab or Muslim, and to use these connections to build relationships overseas.  It is important to evaluate who we have among us already that can help us.  This will better help us understand the world view of the other.

Working through interpreters is continually difficult. Many participants felt the only way to understand culture is through speaking the language themselves.  The military currently has human terrain teams (HTT) that focus on understanding local culture and language.  There is a need for more of these- but drawing more on local cultural experts rather than American anthropologists.

The U.S. Institute of Peace is in the process of putting together sixteen courses on conflict management, culture, and leadership in post-conflict situations.  This resource is much needed and will serve government, military and civil society leaders.

Next Steps:
Participants were asked to identify specific recommendations on how civil society, government, and military professionals can communicate more effectively in the following ways:

1. to analyze and assess conflicts and local contexts,
2. to plan the kinds of interventions that will be both most effective in establishing good governance and security and respectful to local populations,
3.  to train together to build their capacity to work at stabilization and conflict prevention together, and
4. To operate in the same crisis zones together.

Participants agreed that there are not enough forums such as this where participants explore the interactions between civil society and U.S. government institutions within a security framework.  Future meetings will continue to detail and lay out possibilities for increasing the interface between local civil society and US foreign assistance and security infrastructure.

Recorders and Logistical Staff